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Sipherd and Volpe: Evaluating The Legality of Employer Surveillance Under the Family

EVALUATING THE LEGALITY OF EMPLOYER
SURVEILLANCE UNDER THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: HAVE EMPLOYERS
CROSSED THE LINE?

I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") in
order to guarantee employees the right to take unpaid leave so that they
may tend to various family issues and to their health in general.1 What
makes FMLA leave so appealing to employees is that after leave is
taken, the employer is required to reinstate the employee. 2 As with any
benefit given to employees, such as worker's compensation, certain
people are always going to be willing to take advantage of the
government's protection. Some employees are willing to lie to their
employers and make fraudulent claims in order to gain the protections
offered by the FMLA without legitimate reasons to receive these
benefits? Why would employees wait until they or their families are
suffering to get an extended leave from work when they can easily lie
and take leave in order to go on vacation? Employers must be able to
protect themselves in these types of situations and sometimes the only
way they can do so is through conducting surveillance in order to catch
the employee in her lie. °
Employers are always seeking to establish and maintain an efficient
and productive workplace. By implementing a set of workplace rules,
employers can govern the conduct of their employees and in the process
ensure their employees remain focused on the task at hand and
justifiably earn their wages.
With improvements in technology,

1. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (2006).
2. See id. § 2614(a)(1).
3. See, e.g., Vail v. Raybestos Prod. Co., 533 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2008) (the employee
lied to her employer about suffering from migraine headaches in order to take FMLA leave so she
could assist her husband with his yard-care business).
4. See Tresa Baldas, Spying Employers Raise Legal Hackles: Tactic to Track Family Leave
Abuse, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jspid=1202423863654.
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employer monitoring has become increasingly more sophisticated.
Employers are able to monitor every employee at the same time without
the employee's knowledge that she is being watched. 6 Most employees
would not object to cameras being placed openly in their office to
prevent theft. However, what if surveillance is taken even further, going
beyond an employer monitoring its employees at work to the employer
7
hiring a private investigator to trail its employees outside of work?
Employer surveillance with regard to fraudulent FMLA claims (or
what will be referred to as "FMLA surveillance") is not only a very
touchy issue to confront, but it is also a very confusing legal issue to
tackle. This issue encompasses a variety of legal issues, some of which
are not yet settled law. First, it is uncertain whether FMLA surveillance
qualifies as either employer interference or employer retaliation under
the act. In Section I, this note will discuss why employers are not
interfering or retaliating when they engage in surveillance. 8 Second,
surveillance is being conducted in order to verify employees' legitimate
FMLA claims. Due to its intrusive nature, surveillance may conflict
with employees' privacy interests. The right to privacy is a very
complicated issue on its own, and becomes even more complicated when
dealing with the rights of employers and employees inside and outside of
the workplace. In Section II, this note distinguishes the different types
of privacy laws that exist and how these laws apply to claims of
retaliation and interference under the FMLA. The ambiguous nature of
the FMLA allows employees to take advantage of government benefits
and the effect is ultimately detrimental to the productivity of the
workplace and to business as a whole. Surveillance is a legitimate and
lawful means to protect the integrity of an employer's business when
employees fraudulently engage in FMLA abuses.
II.

THE

FMLA:

EMPLOYEE BENEFIT OR EMPLOYER BURDEN?

Employees claim that an employer's use of surveillance harasses,
5. See Shefali N. Baxi & Alisa A. Nickel, Big Brother or Better Business: Striking a Balance
in the Workplace, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 137 (1994).

6. See id. at 138 (noting that employees are often unaware that employers have access to
their email messages).
7. See, e.g., Vail, 533 F.3d at 906 (employer hired an off-duty police officer to trail an
employee).
8. The Seventh Circuit allows for employer surveillance to be conducted in order to back the
employer's honest suspicion that the employee took FMLA leave under fraudulent pretenses. Id. at
909. However, courts such as the Illinois Court of Appeals have ruled that it is the job of the judge
and jury, not the job of the employer, to determine the condition of the employee on leave. See
Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Il. App. Ct. 1998).
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intimidates, and interferes with their right to take leave under the FMLA,
thus, discouraging employees from taking leave for fear of being spied
on. 9 However, it appears that courts are recently ruling in favor of
employers.' 0 In fact, in 2008, the Seventh Circuit upheld an employer's
use of surveillance to reveal an employee's improper use of FMLA
leave."1 This ruling of the Seventh Circuit appears to be in line with the
current trend among courts in the United States. 2 It seems that courts
have authorized employers' surveillance tactics in FMLA cases as long
as the employer has an "honest suspicion."' 13 These recent rulings assist
employers 14in controlling any excessive intermittent leave by their
employees.

Increasingly, employers claim that FMLA abuses have become so15
excessive that a tool is necessary for police to catch abusers.
Therefore, employers have turned to surveillance as a method to protect
themselves against such employees. 16 Employers use surveillance as a
way to catch those who are willing to make a fraudulent FMLA claim17
and also to prevent other employees from making similar false claims.
While surveillance has become a useful tool for employers to investigate
suspicious employee activity, it should not be an automatic first reaction,
but rather a final measure.' 8
A. The FMLA: A HistoricalOverview
Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 with two purposes in mind.
First, the FMLA provides employees who meet certain minimum
qualifications with twelve weeks of unpaid leave. 19 Those employees
that qualify for FMLA leave are automatically reinstated immediately

9. Baldas, supra note 4.
10. Id.; see, e.g., Vail, 533 F.3d at 910 (holding that the employer did not violate employee's
rights under the FMLA); Crouch v. Whirlpool Corp., 447 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
that if the defendant had cause to terminate an employee while at work, it could terminate an
employee while on leave).
11. Vail, 533 F.3d at 909-10; see also Baldas, supra note 4 (noting that the court's ruling in
Vail has the affect of saying "watch out" to FMLA abusers).
12. See Baldas, supranote 4.
13. Vail, 533 F.3d at 909-10; Crouch, 447 F.3d at 988; see Judy Greenwald, Firms Use
Private
Eyes
to
Track
FMLA
Abuse,
Bus.
INS.,
Sept.
1,
2008,

http://www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/article.pl?article-id=25731.
14. See Baldas, supranote 4.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993,29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).
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after the leave period has concluded.20 Second, the FMLA serves as an
anti-discrimination statute that aims to cure gender-related
discrimination in the workplace.2 1 Women traditionally bear more of the
responsibility in caring for the family than men, and the FMLA allows
them to take leave in order to take care of family obligations, while
guaranteeing them their jobs when they are able to return to work.22
Under the FMLA, employers must give eligible employees up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave for a specific enumerated reason.23 These
reasons include: 1) to care for a newborn child; 2) to care for an adopted
or foster child; 3) to care for a family member with a serious health
condition; or 4) to care for the employee's own serious health condition
that renders the employee unable to perform her job.24 During the
employee's leave, the employer is required to maintain the employee's
health insurance.25 Also, upon returning from leave, an employee is to
be reinstated in the same or equivalent position that the employee held
prior to the leave; she cannot be demoted or placed in an inferior
position.26 To do so would constitute a violation of the statute.27
Although FMLA leave is unpaid, it still attracts abusers who take
leave under fraudulent circumstances; for example, some employees
take leave in order to work different jobs and others take leave to gain
additional time off from work.28 Even though FMLA leave is unpaid,
the costs associated with employee absenteeism are high and all too real
to the employer. 29 Employers are turning to surveillance as a means to
30
keep down the costs resulting from a loss in workplace productivity.
Surveillance is "becoming more prevalent, particularly as more courts
are addressing the issue.'
Increasingly, courts are allowing
surveillance of employees as long as it is "done within reasonable limits

20. Id. § 2614(a)(1)(A).
21. Id. § 2601(b)(4); see also Kilvitis v. County of Luzeme, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (M.D.
Pa. 1999) (noting that one of the express purposes of the FMLA is to eliminate gender
discrimination); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 550 n.10 (2004) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(noting that the FMLA is "narrowly targeted" to address gender discrimination under family leave).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(a)(5), 2614(a)(1)(A).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
24. Id.; Kilvitis, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
25. 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(b) (2009); Johnson v. Runyon, No. 1:97-CV-794, 1999 WL 893841,
at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 1999).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).
28. Greenwald, supra note 13.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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and upon a reasonable basis. 3 2 The main purpose of surveillance is to
uncover evidence contradicting any disparity between an employee's
proffered reason for taking leave and the actual physical realities of the
situation.33 Surveillance can be used to demonstrate that an employee's
claim is fraudulent and that it should not be paid.34 Therefore,
employers are increasingly adopting the use of surveillance as a control
mechanism in 35order to prevent employees from taking advantage of
FMLA claims.

B. Employers, are your Employees Sufferingfrom a "Serious" Health
Condition?
Employers struggle to comply with the extremely complicated law
that embodies the FMLA.36 The application of FMLA is foiled by
interpretative issues, the greatest of which is determining the threshold
requirement for qualifying leave-the existence of a "serious health
condition., 37 The FMLA defines "serious health condition" as an
illness, impairment, injury, or mental or physical condition that requires
inpatient care in a medical care facility of continuing treatment by a
health care provider.3 8 Although Congress enacted the FMLA over
fifteen years ago, employers still struggle with its application and its
administration.39
In the FMLA's legislative history, Congress identified a list of
ailments that, although not exhaustive, were intended to exemplify
Congress
various medical conditions warranting protection.4 °
distinguished mild illnesses from more serious conditions that merit
FMLA protection.41 Congress' list suggests accommodation of both

32. Id.
33. See generally id. (discussing how employers should be able to articulate their suspicions
of FMLA violations).
34. Elizabeth J. Bradford, Use of Surveillance Videotape to Prove Workers' Compensation
Fraud,66 AM. JURIS. TRIALS 1,§ 1 (2008).

35. Baldas, supra note 4.
36. See Judy Greenwald, FMLA Rule Tweaks Help Ease Concerns, BUS. INS., Jan. 12, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 925505 (noting that employers often struggle with how to address the
broad definition of "serious health condition" and how to manage intermittent leave under the

statute).
Nov. 4, 1997,
37. See Allan N. Taffet, Family Medical Leave Act Five Years Later, N.Y. L.J.,
at I (noting decisions construing the FMLA involve interpretation of a "serious health condition).

38. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2006).
39. See generally id. ("In 1997 alone, federal courts have issued almost 100 decisions
stemming from complaints containing FMLA claims.").
40. See S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 31 (1993).
41. Id. at 30 ("The term 'serious health condition' is not intended to cover short-term
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illnesses and conditions that require an absence from work that lasts for
more than a few days in order for the employee to obtain treatment or
recover. 42 Additionally, "serious health condition" is also defined in the
FMLA's accompanying regulations, promulgated by the Department of
Labor ("DOL").43 Today these regulations are the dominant source of
interpretive guidance for both employers and courts administering the
FMLA.4 4
The DOL's regulations originally defined "serious health
condition" as any injury, illness, impairment, or physical or mental
condition that involves either inpatient care, absence for three or more
calendar days, or continuing treatment by or under the supervision of a
health care provider.45 This definition seemingly mimics the FMLA's
definition.46 However, after some deliberation, the DOL expanded the
qualifying conditions required for an employee to take leave.47 In
addition, the DOL redefined what constitutes a "chronic health
condition. '' 8 Furthermore, a new list of minor ailments was added.49
These aliments would not be considered a serious health condition
unless certain complications arose. 50 If such complications do occur,
these minor ailments then qualify under the FMLA as "chronic health
conditions." 5t However, the term "complications" was never defined in
the regulations.
Therefore, this new criteria qualifies almost any

conditions for which treatment and recovery are very brief.").
42. Id.at31.
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a) (2009).
44. See Taffet, supra note 37, at 37 (noting how the courts have been thrown into the role of
"medical diagnostician" and the DOL has qualified the term "serious health condition"); see also
Gay v. Gilman Paper Co., 125 F.3d 1432, 1434 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that where the FMLA is
silent, the regulations provide guidance in defining terms); Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 123 F.3d 1140,
1141 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing regulatory criteria as a means of interpreting the FMLA); Price v.
Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing interim regulations to clarify
terms found in the FMLA).
45. 29C.F.R. § 825.114(a).
46. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a), with 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2006).
47. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(a).
48. Id. § 825.115(c); see Deborah Shalowitz Cowans, Employer Concerns Find a Voice in
FMLA Regulations Conditionsfor Leave Clarified, BUS. INS., Jan. 16, 1995, at 2 (describing
changes by the DOL to FMLA regulations).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(d) ("Ordinarily, unless complications arise, the common cold, the
flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers, headaches other than migraine, routine dental or
orthodontia problems, periodontal disease, etc., are examples of conditions that do not meet the
definition of a serious health condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave.").
50. Id.
51. Id.(noting that certain conditions are not covered unless "complications develop").
52. Id.; see Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 1997) ("While the final
rule does state that 'unless complications arise' 'minor ulcers' are not covered by the FMLA, the
final rule fails to indicate what 'complications' distinguish a 'serious' ulcer from a 'minor' one.").
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condition that employees might possibly have as a "serious health
condition. 53
Inconsistent interpretations of "serious health condition" cause
employers and employees to disagree, over what qualifies for FMLA
protection. 4 Often, FMLA claims arise only after an employer refuses
to reinstate an employee, who was out of work on a presumed FMLA
Therefore, the judiciary becomes a medical
protected leave.5 5
to decide what constitutes a "serious health
order
in
diagnostician
5
6
Acting in this role, courts have held that conditions such as
condition.
food poisoning, shortness of breath, chest pains, stomach virus, and
carpal tunnel syndrome do not qualify for FMLA protection.57
Although courts have dismissed FMLA cases because an
employee's illness did not qualify as a "serious health condition," these
decisions offer little practical guidance to employers trying to determine
whether the employee qualifies for FMLA leave. 58 Employers should
review their current practices to ensure that they are properly evaluating
and designating as FMLA leave any qualifying workers' compensation
absence, any intermittent absences for treatment, and any time lost
because of an employee's reduced work schedule. 59 The broadness of
53. Debra E. Christenson, Note, Victorelli v. Shadyside Hospital-ChronicSerious Health
Conditions Covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 Create Administrative
Headachesfor Employers, 43 VILL. L. REV. 973, 989 (1998).
54. Cf Taffet, supra note 37, at I (noting that court decisions interpreting the FMLA have
centered around interpretation of what constitutes a "serious health condition").
55. See Mary Jean Geroulo, Comment, The Family and Medical Leave Act: Reinstatement
Following Leave: How to Cope from the Employer's Perspective, 2 HOuS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 53
(2002), available at http://www.hbtlj.org/volume2.html (noting how employers struggle with how
to return an employee to work under the statute).
56. Taffet, supra note 37, at I ("[C]ourts have been thrust into the role of medical
diagnostician in dozens of cases, examining the gravity of medical maladies ranging from chicken
pox to food poisoning to ingrown toenails, even though both Congress and the Department of Labor
have sought to define 'serious health condition."').
57. See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming
summary judgment where plaintiff suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome); Boyce v. New York City
Mission Soc'y, 963 F. Supp. 290, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to qualify shortness of breath and
chest pains as serious health conditions); Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988, 999
(N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that a stomach virus was not a serious health condition); Hott v. VDO
Yazaki Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1114, 1128 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding that sinobronchitis does not
constitute a serious health condition); Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc'ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465,
474, 476 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that routine pregnancy discomfort is not a serious health
condition); Brannon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1032, 1037 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
(finding that gastroenteritis and an upper respiratory tract infection did not meet the requirements
for serious health conditions); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F. Supp. 253, 259 (N.D. Miss. 1995),
affd, 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to declare food poising a serious health condition).
58. See Taffet, supra note 37, at 6.
59. Jonathan S. Forman, Struggling to Comply with FMLA: Designating Family Medical
Leave, 5 NO. II EMP. L. STRATEGIST 1, 1 (1998).
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"serious health condition" makes it difficult to know whether the given
reasons for leave are legitimate.60 When faced with an employee who
may take leave for an FMLA qualifying reason, employers should
investigate and make a designation either before the start of the
foreseeable leave or immediately upon learning of the employee's need
for emergency leave. 6 ' Thus, due to the broadness surrounding a
"serious health condition," employers need some way to protect
themselves from employees who abuse the FMLA.
C. FMLA Employer Surveillance: Retaliationor Interference?
Many cases involving employer surveillance in response to
fraudulent employee leave under the FMLA reach the courts by way of
claims of employer retaliation.62 The FMLA prohibits the employer
from discharging or taking adverse action against an employee for
engaging in lawful activity through means protected by the statute.63 In
order to prevail in a claim based on employer retaliation, the employee
must prove that she engaged in an activity protected by the act, that she
was adversely affected by an employment decision, and that there was a
"causal connection" between the employee's protected action and the
adverse employment action taken by the employer. 64 An employee can
claim retaliation when she is injured because she engaged in a protected
action, for example taking valid leave from work in accordance with the
FMLA.6 5 This extension of the FMLA favors employees and forces
them to take extra care before disciplining any employee who has taken
FMLA leave-even those for which the employer has a sufficient reason
to discipline.
1. The Supreme Court Applies Title VII to the FMLA
Retaliation

claims

follow the individual disparate treatment

60. Cf Taffet, supra note 37, at 6 (noting that under the DOL's definition of serious health
condition, even a single examination by a doctor who prescribes antibiotics could warrant FMLA
leave).
61. Forman, supra note 59, at 2-3.
62. See, e.g., Williams v. Lyondell-Citgo Refining Co., 247 F. App'x 466, 467 (5th Cir.
2007); Jennings v. Mid-Am. Energy Co., 282. F. Supp. 2d 954, 962 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Clark v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 743, 745 (11. App. Ct. 1998).
63. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006).
64. Burch v. WDAS AM/FM, No. CIV.A. 00-4852, 2002 WL 1471703, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June
28, 2002).
65. 45A AM. JtJR. 2D Job Discrimination§ 244 (2002).
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approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.66 In
McDonnell Douglas, Percy Green, a black civil rights activist, was laid
off due to general downsizing at the company for which he was
employed.67 After being discharged, Green participated in illegal
68
activity against his employer, McDonnell Douglas, to protest his firing.
Green then attempted to be rehired at his old position in the company as
a mechanic.69 McDonnell Douglas turned Green down for the position
claiming Green was not hired, although he was qualified for the position,
because he had been arrested for illegal activity. 70 However, Green
alleged his denial for rehire was racially motivated and McDonnell
Douglas' reason was based on his participation in illegal conduct. 71 In
deciding this case, the Supreme Court established a proof structure for
inferential individual disparate treatment cases. 72 According to the proof
structure, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case by proving that
the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for
the employment position, that despite qualifications the plaintiff was
rejected, and that after rejection the position remained open.73 After the
plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
defendant who must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
the decision to dismiss the plaintiffs claim.74 If the defendant is able to
prove a legitimate reason for the plaintiff s dismissal, the burden returns
to the plaintiff who then 75needs to show that the articulated reason
proffered was mere pretext.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are
prohibited from discriminating against employees on the basis of race,
76
Instances of employment
color, religion, sex, and national origin.
discrimination under Title VII can take the form of disparate treatment.77
"Individual disparate treatment is a form of employment discrimination
in which the employer treats one or more of its employees less favorably
than other employees because of the former's race, color, religion, sex,

66. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
67. Id. at 794.
68. Id. at 794-95.
69. Id. at 796.
70. See id. at 796.
71. Id. at 801.
72. Id. at 802.
73. Id. at 802.
74. Id. at 802-03.
75. Id. at 804.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
77. See Roy L. Brooks, The Structure of Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation After
Hopkins, 6 LAB. LAW. 215 (1990).
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or national origin., 78 The phrase "because of' is the causal link between
an employee's unfavorable treatment and the employer's impermissible
motivation, between the act and the state of mind.79 The Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas, the first individual disparate treatment case,
suggested that if plaintiffs unfavorable treatment was tainted by an
impermissible motivation that would be sufficient to support the
inference, then the unfavorable treatment was, in fact, caused by the
impermissible motivation.8" Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that
"in the implementation of . . . [personnel decisions], it is abundantly
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise.,81 The Court adopted a "but for" causation standard,
reasoning that disparate treatment discrimination occurs when plaintiff
shows that but for the use of an impermissible criterion, such as race,
color, and sex, the adverse personnel decision would not have been
made.
Federal courts adopted this proof structure for FMLA claims
although modifying it as applied to retaliation claims. 83 Where there is
no direct evidence that retaliation actually exists, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of retaliation using indirect evidence.84 The
plaintiff must prove that she availed herself of a protected right under the
FMLA by notifying the employer of her intent to take leave.85 Then the
plaintiff must prove that she was adversely affected by an employment
decision.86 Finally, the plaintiff must prove that there is a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment
action.87 The plaintiff can show that an employer's reasons for dismissal
were pretextual in one of three ways: 1) by showing that the proffered
reasons had no basis in fact, 2) by showing that the proffered reasons did
not actually motivate his discharge, or 3) by showing that that proffered
reasons were insufficient to motivate her discharge.88 The Sixth Circuit
78.

Id.at220-21.

79. See Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (noting the substantive
standard of causation required in disparate treatment and disparate impact litigation, the latter of
which deals with the causal link between an observed statistical disparity and a specific employment
practice).
80.

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.

81. Id.
82. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
282 (1989). See also Brooks, supra note 77, at 225.
83. Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2004).
84. McConnell v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 198 F. App'x 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2006).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994).
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has held that the plaintiff "must allege more than a dispute over facts
upon which his discharge was based ' 89 and in addition, "must put forth
evidence which demonstrates that the employer did not 'honestly
believe' in the proffered non-discriminatory reason for its adverse
employment action." 90
After the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, as in McDonnell
Douglas, the burden shifts to the employer who must demonstrate a
legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its decision. 91 One tool that courts
have allowed employers in the face of FMLA retaliation claims is the
honest belief defense. If the employer can establish that it reasonably
relied on the particular facts before taking an adverse employment action
against the employee, it can prove that its action was not pretextual,
meaning that the adverse action was not taken because the employee
exercised her right to take FMLA leave. 92 Courts have extended this
rule by holding that the employer does not have to leave "no stone
unturned" prior to making an adverse decision against an employee
when reasonably relying upon the particularized facts.93 This rule is
designed to protect the legitimate business judgment of employers. 94 If
the employer honestly believes that the employee needs to be disciplined
and can give an honest explanation of its actions then it is not up to the
court to second guess the employer's decision.95 Some courts have
recently extended this rule to mean that an employer cannot be held
liable for retaliation if it can simply prove that it would have fired the
employee regardless of whether
or not the employee took leave in
96
accordance with the FMLA.
...- In addition to the pretext proof structure established in McDonnell
Douglas, under Title VII individual disparate treatment can be analyzed
under the mixed motive framework. Recently the Fifth Circuit applied
the Supreme Court's "mixed motive" analysis to retaliation claims under
the FMLA.9 7 The court held that retaliation could be proved if an
employee's protected action under the FMLA is "a motivating factor" in

89. Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2001).
90. Id. at 494.
91. McConnell, 198 F. App'x at 442.
92. Id. at 443.
93. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Lowe v. Alabama
Power Co, 244 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) ("The key inquiry is whether the employer made a
reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action.").
94. See Smith, 155 F.3dat 807.
95. See Henrick v. W. Res. Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 462 (6th Cir. 2004).
96. Thorneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005);
Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. 164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1999).
97. See Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2005).
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an adverse action against the employee.98 When there is no direct
evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent under the FMLA, courts
typically have relied upon the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis in order to determine if an employer's action against an
99
employee for exercising FMLA-related leave was retaliatory.
However, in 2003 the Supreme Court decided in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa'00 that an employee bringing a claim under an anti-discrimination
statute can prove the third step of the McDonnell Douglas proof
structure by showing either that the employer's proffered reasons are
pretext or that the proffered reason, while true, is but one reason for the
action, while another reason was discriminatory. 10 1 If the employee is
able to show that discrimination was one of the motivating factors in the
adverse action, the employer must then prove that it would have taken
the same action despite that alleged discriminatory reason.' °2 This is
known as the mixed motive analysis and it has been applied to other
anti-discrimination situations. 10 3 However, until recently, only 0the
Fifth
4
Circuit has applied the mixed motive analysis to FMLA claims.1
In Richardson v. Monitronics International,Inc., 10 5 the employee
worked in the customer service department of Monitronics which had a
policy stating that employees would be disciplined for lateness,
absences, and dress code violations. 10 6 In January 2001, Richardson was
diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. 10 7 In the first four months of
2002, she had twelve absences and twenty-two tardies, for which she
was suspended.108 In April 2002, Richardson took FMLA-approved
leave and when she returned from leave, she was reinstated to her prior
position. 10 9 However, after being reinstated, Richardson's employer did
not permit her to work until she received updated training.110 Shortly
thereafter, Richardson filed a lawsuit alleging her FMLA rights had been
violated, which she lost.'
Richardson continued her employment at
98.
99.

Id. at 335.
Id. at 332; Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2004).

100. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
101. Id. at 101-02.
102. Id.at 101.
103. See Maria Greco Danaher, The Court Uses "Mixed Motive" Analysis in FMLA
Discrimination Case, 8 No. 2 LAW. J. 3 (2006).
104. See id.
105. 434 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2005).
106. Id. at 331.
107. Id. at 330.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Monitronics after the lawsuit; she also continued her frequent absence
12
and tardiness until she was fired in 2003 for violating company policy.'
As a result, Richardson filed another lawsuit 1alleging
that her
13
termination was in retaliation for her previous lawsuit.
The Fifth Circuit analyzed the case under a mixed motive analysis
and found that Richardson had presented enough evidence to create an
issue of fact regarding the motive for her discharge. 14 However,
Monitronics was able to prove that it would have terminated Richardson15
regardless her taking FMLA leave and, therefore, prevailed.'
Monitronics was able to overcome the mixed motive analysis by
supporting its position with clear and consistently
applied policies
1 16
actions.'
disciplinary
documented
with
coupled
2. Interference or Fair Warning?
In addition to retaliation claims, which prevent the employer from
taking adverse employment actions against employees, employees can
also claim that their employer interfered with their statutory right to take
FMLA leave. 117 An employee can claim interference when their
employer denies them a right set forth in the FMLA statute.1 18 Examples
of interference would be denying the employee a full twelve week leave,
failing to reinstate the employee at the end of the leave, or even failing
to allow the employee to take leave at all.' 19 In order to win an
interference claim, the employee must prove that: 1) she is an eligible
employee; 2) that the defendant is her employer; 3) that she was entitled
to leave under the FMLA; 4) that she gave notice to the employer that
she was going to take leave; and 5) that the employer denied the
employee some benefit that she was entitled to in accordance within the
statute.1 20 In essence, because employees do not have to prove intent on
the part of the employer, employers are required to give those employees
who exercise their right to take leave certain advantages not granted to
other employees or face claims of interference, including reinstatement.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 331-32.
at 332.
at 334-35.
at 336.

U6. Danaher, supra note 103, at 3.
117. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2006).
118. See Edgar v. JAC Prod., Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006).
119. See Id. ("the FMLA does not provide leave for leave's sake, but instead provides leave
with an exception that an employee will return to work after the leave ends" (quoting Thomeberry
v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 978 (8th Cir. 2005))).
120. Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Employers may be fearful terminating employees who take leave under
the FMLA in order to avoid retaliation claims. This may put employees
who have taken leave at an advantage over those who have not taken
leave, which gives employees even more of an incentive to abuse the
statute.
For interference claims, once the employee demonstrates her right
to take FMLA established leave was interfered with, the employer bears
the burden of proof. In Bachelder v. American Western Airlines,'2' the
Ninth Circuit evaluated an employee's ability to use the FMLA in
regards to an employer making an adverse employment decision. 12 2 In
Bachelder, an employee took absences that the employer decided were
not covered under the FMLA.123 The employer then used these absences
as its justification for firing the employee.1 24 The court held that the
employee absences were protected by the FMLA125 and concluded that:
In order to prevail on her claim, ... [plaintiff] need only prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that her taking of FMLA-protected
leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate her. She
can prove this claim . . . by using either direct or circumstantial
No126scheme shifting the burden of production
evidence, or both ....
back and forth is required.
The employer violated the FMLA because the leave taken by the
2
employee was used as a negative factor in the employment action. 1
The FLMA protects employees against disciplinary action based on
absences, if those absences are for one of the FMLA's enumerated
reasons. 28 Therefore, it is unlawful for any employer to interfere with,
29
restrain, or deny the exercise of any right provided under the FMLA.1
Any action taken by the employer that deters employees from enjoying
protected activities constitutes "interference" or "restraint" of the
employees' exercise of their rights. 30 Employees are entitled to engage
in protected activities under the FMLA and to take leave from work for

121.

259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).

122.

Id. at 1122.

123. Id. at 1121.
124. Id. at 1126.
125. Id.

126.
127.
protected
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1125.
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2006) (employers are prohibited from discriminating against
employee's who have used FMLA leave).
Bachelder,259F.3dat1119.
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a)(I) (2006).
Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
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qualifying reasons. 131
Unfortunately, because of the advantage the statute gives to
employees combined with the law protecting against employer
retaliation, many employees attempt to abuse the statute.1 32 Employees
claiming that they are taking protected leave have been known to go on
vacation, run errands, or even in certain situations work other jobs.1 33 It
is this fraudulent activity and abuse that has driven many employers to
fight back using tactics such as surveillance that may be seen as extreme
to outside parties. 34 Surveillance is viewed by employees as a form of
harassment, intimidation, and even as interference with their ability to
exercise their rights under the FMLA. 135 Employees will also argue that
FMLA surveillance prevents them and their co-workers from taking
leave in accordance with the statute because it creates a lingering fear
that they will be spied on outside of work. 13 6 These are legitimate and
valid concerns; however, because of the way the statute has been
interpreted, employers are left with no other means of protection from
those employees willing to go to great lengths to abuse FMLA leave.
3. Uncovering the Truth: Reasonable Surveillance is Not Retaliation
The employer's use of surveillance is a very touchy subject.
According to the Vail decision, employers are allowed to spy on their
employees not only when they are suspicious the employee is taking
fraudulent leave, but also in any situation where the information gained
by surveillance may be used as evidence to support an honest belief
defense. 137 If surveillance is legal for this purpose, then is the
surveillance also legal if the employee has a legitimate reason to take
leave, or does surveillance in these situations constitute employer
retaliation?
The Seventh Circuit has extended the honest belief defense not only
to apply to adverse action against an employee, but also as a justification
to allow the employer to conduct surveillance on an employee it believes
is taking FMLA leave under fraudulent pretenses.138 In Vail v.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1123.
See Baldas, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Vail v. Raybestos Prod. Co., 533 F.3d 904, 909-10 (7th Cir. 2008).
Seeld. at 905.
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Raybestos, 139 Diana Vail was on FMLA leave due to chronic migraines
and was suspected of lying by her employer, Raybestos. 140 Raybestos
hired an off duty police officer to monitor Vail's activities while on
FMLA leave. 141 The officer observed Vail mowing lawns for her
husband's landscaping company. 142 The Seventh Circuit upheld the
employer's right to spy on an employee who is suspected of abusing
FMLA-granted leave. 143 The court held that the employer's surveillance
tactics were legal because they were used to supply the employer with an
honest suspicion that the employee was using her leave in order to work
another job. 144 This ruling has a huge impact on employees willing to
take advantage of the FMLA as a way to get off from work with no
consequence. 45 If employers are allowed to use surveillance in order to
supply their honest belief of improper
FMLA use, employees will be
146
statute.
the
abuse
to
likely
much less
a. Some Courts Rule Surveillance is not Retaliation
In Williams v. Lyondell-Citgo Ref Co. ,147 the Fifth Circuit held that
Citgo's retention of an investigator used to conduct surveillance on
Williams when he was on FMLA sick leave was not evidence of
retaliation.148 Williams claimed that he was denied sick pay by Citgo in
retaliation for his prior use of FMLA leave. 149 As evidence of Citgo's
retaliation, Williams described a ten day period in which Citgo placed
him under the watchful eye of a private investigator. 15 Citgo relied on
an honest belief defense and argued that the reason it denied Williams'
sick pay was not because he took FMLA leave, but because Williams
was not legitimately ill.' 5' The court agreed with Citgo's argument and
it
ruled that the surveillance of Williams was not retaliation; in fact 52
actually served as evidence supporting Citgo's honest belief defense.
The court reasoned that the retention of the investigator supported the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 907.
See id. at 910.
Id. at 909-10.
See Baldas, supra note 4.
Id.
247 F. App'x 466 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 470-71.
Id.
Id.at471.
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 471.
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fact that Citgo honestly believed Williams was lying to the
corporation. 53
'
In Jennings v. Mid-American Energy Co.,154 the court ruled that
summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer when evidence
was uncovered that her fellow employees had seen her shopping on
multiple occasions while she was on FMLA leave. 1 5 Jennings was seen
by one of her co-workers at a Toys "R" Us store after being sent home
from work early because of a nagging hand injury. 5 6 The next day, she
called in sick from work and was again spotted by a co-worker
shopping, this time at a SuperTarget store. 157 The following day,
Jennings again called in sick to work. 158 Based on the evidence received
from her fellow employees, Jennings was called into work to meet with
her supervisor. 5 9 During this meeting she was given the choice to either0
resign or be terminated because of her alleged misuse of FMLA leave.16
The employer moved for summary judgment in regards to the retaliation
claim, and the motion was granted.' 6 1 The court reasoned that an
employee's dishonesty and misuse of leave time 62are valid and
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating an employee. 1
These rulings allow employers to use surveillance, under the
FMLA, in order to prevent employee abuse of the statute, and to protect
themselves from unwarranted retaliation claims. These rulings do not
prevent the employee from arguing interference if she is denied a
specific benefit provided by the statute. However, the Seventh Circuit
held in Crouch v. Whirlpool Corp.163 that the employer can use
information gained on surveillance as evidence in order to defeat an
interference claim by showing that the employee did not take leave for
the intended purpose. 164 Here, Crouch and his fianc6e both worked for
Whirlpool and requested time off during the same time period so that

153. Id.
154.

282 F. Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Iowa 2003).

155. Id. at 962-64. The court ruled that the employee should be given every opportunity to
prove that their use of leave was permissible; however, the court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment after substantial evidence was gained by surveillance conducted by fellow
employees. Id.
156. Id. at957.
157. Id.

158.

Id. at 958.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 964.
162. Id. at 963.

163. 447 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2006).
164. See id. at 986.
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they could go on vacation together. 165 Crouch's fiancee was allowed to
take her vacation; however, Crouch was denied the time off because of
his low seniority status. 166 Crouch then claimed he was injured and
presented a doctor's note and in accordance, Whirlpool granted him
leave under the FMLA. 167 After Whirlpool realized that Crouch's
FMLA leave coincided with his denied vacation request, it hired a
private detective to monitor Crouch.168 While Crouch was on FMLA
leave, the detective videotaped him performing yard work while he
69
claimed he was unable to work at Whirlpool because of a knee injury.1
As a result of the surveillance, Whirlpool fired Crouch.1 70 After his
termination, Crouch brought suit claiming Whirlpool interfered with his
FMLA rights for failure to reinstate him.1 71 Whirlpool was able to
defeat the interference claim by using the evidence it obtained through
video surveillance which showed that Crouch did not take leave for the
intended purpose of recovering from his knee injury.172
These rulings make surveillance a valuable tool, empowering
employers in the face of abusive employees. Not only does surveillance
allow employers to avoid retaliation claims by discovering evidence of
FMLA abuse, it also aids in establishing an honest belief defense,
allowing employers to obtain evidence to protect themselves from
claims of unestablished interference.
Although the benefits of
surveillance are apparent, employers need to think long and hard before
deciding to take this preventative measure. If employers fail to take the
appropriate steps and necessary care to protect themselves, conducting
surveillance on their employees outside of work can be just as damaging
as it is beneficial.
b. Some Courts Hold Surveillance is Retaliation
Surveillance can be damaging to the employer. When the employer
attempts to rely on surveillance as a reason to take adverse employment
action, surveillance can backfire and the evidence gained by the
employer's surveillance does not justify the adverse action."' In these
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 984-85.
Seeid. at985.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

171.

Id.

172. Seeid. at986.
173. See Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 743, 748 (II1. App. Ct.
1998). The court granted summary judgment in favor of the employee, ruling that the surveillance
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cases, employers
may be held liable for retaliating against the
74
employee. 1
For example, in Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc.,
Owens-Brockway terminated Clark because it believed that Clark filed a
false workmen's compensation claim. 75 After granting Clark a medical
release, Owens-Brockway suspected her of malingering and hired a
private detective. 176 The detective videotaped Clark mowing her lawn
and Owens-Brockway used this evidence as motivation to terminate her
because it felt that if Clark could mow her lawn, then she must have
been physically able to return to work. 17 7 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Clark in light of the evidence because the videotape
of Clark doing lawn work was irrelevant to the case. 178 The court further
reasoned that it is not the job of the judge, jury, or employer to
determine when the employee is physically able to return to work. 179 If
the employer wanted to challenge Clark's injury
the correct route would
0
have been through the Industrial Commission.18
Employers find themselves in a very difficult situation. They are in
a position where they must balance their employees' right to privacy
with their business prerogative of insuring that workers do not take leave
from work under fraudulent pretenses. In order to achieve this balance,
employers are forced to walk a fine line by instituting tactics such as
surveillance. In light of the adoption of the FMLA, some employers are
left with few options other than conducting surveillance in order to
protect their business interests from those employees who are willing to
lie and take advantage of these loose legal rules. Surveillance can
prevent employees from taking fraudulent leave, but because of these
decisions it may also put the employer in an even more disadvantageous
position because the employee is given every opportunity to prove the
employer wrong and even further opportunity to lie if they are willing to
do so.
c. Employers Need Surveillance in Order to Protect Themselves
The Supreme Court has yet to rule whether FMLA surveillance

was not justified. Id. at 748-49.
174.
175.
176.
177.

!d. at 748.
Id. at 745.
Id.
See id.

178. Id. at 748.
179.

Id. at 747-48.

180. Id. at 748.
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classifies as retaliation. Until the Court does so, each state can
potentially have a different rule regarding the issue. For example, in
Texas, employers are able to conduct surveillance when they have an
honest belief that the employee has taken leave under fraudulent
pretenses. 181 However, in Illinois, an employer who conducts videotape
surveillance on an employee it believes is taking 82leave under false
pretenses will be held liable for employer retaliation.'
More recently, courts have been siding with employers.' 83 In 2008,
the Seventh Circuit sent a message through its ruling in Vail that
employees looking to use FMLA leave as a "get-out-of-work-free card"
should beware.' 84 Allowing employers to conduct surveillance on those
employees which they honestly believe have made fraudulent claims in
order to get off from work should make employees think twice before
they elect to take advantage of their employers.' 85 An employee may no
longer want to lie in order to take some extra time off from work
because she knows that if she does, she runs the risk of having her
privacy intruded on and even worse, if she is caught in her lie, she may
possibly even be fired from her job.
When this matter is taken to the Supreme Court, the Court should
adopt the decisions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.1 86 The purpose of
FMLA leave is to allow an employee who qualifies for leave to take off
from work for a substantial period of time while guaranteeing the
187
employee that they will not be adversely affected when they return.
This is not an insignificant right. Moreover, these protections are
justified because the federal government has a substantial amount of
interest in protecting the interests of the employee in situations where
employees are legally permitted to take leave. Caring for a new born or
adopted child, a family member with a serious health condition, or an
employees' own serious health condition are situations that warrant
181. The Fifth Circuit ruled that FMLA surveillance can be used to support an employer's
defense of honest belief. See, e.g., Williams v. Lyondell-Citgo Refining Co., 247 F. App'x 466, 471
(5th Cir. 2007).
182. The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that it was not the job of the employer to determine
whether or not the employee took leave under false pretenses. See Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 743, 748 (II1.App. Ct. 1998).
183. See, e.g., Baldas, supra note 4.
184.

Id.

185. The Seventh Circuit ruled that employer surveillance tactics are legal because the
information gained can be used to supply the employer with an honest belief that the employee is
using FMLA leave for illegal reasons. See Vail v. Raybestos Prod. Co., 533 F.3d 904, 909-10 (7th
Cir. 2008).
186. See id.; e.g., Williams v. Lyondell-Citgo Refining Co., 247 F. App'x 466, 471 (5th Cir.
2007).

187.

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614 (2006).
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protection. 188 However, suffering from shortness of breath or common
chest pains, 189 working a second job, 190 or taking non-penalized time off
from work to go on vacation' 91 are not reasons for leave that the
government is interested in protecting.
Employers have a legitimate need to protect their own interests.
One of these interests is maintaining production in the workplace. When
an employee exercises her right to take FMLA leave, her employer
inherently loses some of this productivity because it is now short one
employee and is not able to permanently replace that employee to make
up for the lOSS. 192 Employers can most likely afford to take this hit from
time to time, but if too many of their employees take leave or take leave
too frequently; the employer may suffer significant losses. The FMLA
limits the justifiable reasons an employee may take FMLA leave to
serious situations that do not happen very frequently. 193 However, if
employees are able to make unsubstantiated FMLA claims without the
threat of surveillance looming over their shoulder, employees willing to
take advantage of their employers may be out from work much more
frequently than the statute intended; thus, preventing their employers
from running businesses as productively as possible.
Although not ideal, allowing employers to take measures of
surveillance when they honestly believe that their employees are taking
FMLA leave for unwarranted reasons is a necessary step in guaranteeing
a productive workplace. The purpose of the FMLA is not to give all
employees an absolute right to take twelve unpaid weeks off from work
whenever they see fit. 19 4 This is essentially what the government would
be allowing if employees are permitted to claim a serious injury and
receive the benefits of the statute without having the claim substantiated
by their employer. One way to prevent employees from taking
advantage of their employers is to allow employers to conduct
surveillance in situations where they reasonably feel the employee is

188. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(I)(A)-(D).
189. See Boyce v. New York City Mission Soc'y, 963 F. Supp. 290, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(refusing to qualify shortness of breath and chest pains as a serious health condition).
190. See Vail v. Raybestos Prod. Co., 533 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to permit
protection to an employee who took FMLA leave in order to work a second job mowing lawns for
her husband's company).
191. See Crouch v. Whirlpool Corp., 447 F.3d 984, 984-5 (7th Cir. 2006) (where an employee
lied to his employer about a knee injury in order to take FMLA leave so he could go on vacation
with his fiancee during her vacation time).
192. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2614 (2006) (guaranteeing employees reinstatement to the same
position when returning from FMLA leave).
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2006).
194. See Baldas, supra note 4.
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taking leave under fraudulent pretenses. Surveillance would not prevent
those with legitimate reasons from taking leave, but it would make an
employee think twice before attempting to defraud her employer.
III. THE "RIGHT" TO PRIVACY: NOT SO CLEAR

Balanced against an employer's right to seek and maintain a
productive and efficient workplace is the employee's right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been and continues to be a source of much
debate among American legal scholars for a great many years. 95 The
idea that a person has a right to privacy has been articulated in Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis' article "The Right to Privacy."1' 96 At the
time of their article, new technologies, such as the camera, printing
press, tabloid papers, and the telephone led Warren and Brandeis to
197
consider one's right to privacy, a right that had previously not existed.
Later, President Woodrow Wilson appointed Brandeis to the Supreme
198
Court where he further attempted to establish the right to privacy.
However, after a series of state law decisions in the early 1900s,
Professor William Prosser developed a four-category approach to
privacy that differed from Warren and Brandeis' definition. 199
Eventually, Prosser's approach was adopted in the Restatement of
Torts.200 Thus, a legal split was developed and continues today on the
01
definitional approach to privacy.
Sources for privacy law are derived from tort law, constitutional

195. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV.193,
197 (1890).
196. Id. at 195; Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You're on Candid Camera: Privacy and
Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1084-86 (1997).
197. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, THE LAW OF PRIVACY EXPLAINED 8 (Privacy Journal 1993);

Burrows, supra note 196, at 1085; Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
1335, 1361 (1992) (noting that Brandeis believed that technology's impact on privacy would
become very profound); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 195, at 195.
198. Burrows, supra note 196, at 1085; Gormley, supra note 197, at 1357; see also Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (asserting that new
technology has resulted in subtler and more far-reaching means of invading individual privacy).
199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B-652E (1977); SMITH, supra note 197, at
14; Burrows, supra note 196, at 1085; see also Andrew J.McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of
the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liabilityfor Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 997-98
& n.40 (1992) (Prosser determined that the law of privacy was comprised of four torts: "1. Intrusion
upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 2. Public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff, 3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye; [and] 4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or
likeness.").
200. Burrows, supra note 196, at 1085; McClurg, supra note 199, at 998 n.40.
201. Burrows, supra note 196, at 1085; Gormley, supra note 197, at 1339.
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law, criminal procedure, civil procedure, family law, and contracts.
Therefore, the right to privacy is a difficult idea to pin down. Moreover,
the right to privacy means "different things to different people. 20 3 The
notion that the right to privacy is a constitutionally protected right stems
from the Bill of Rights and more specifically the Fourth Amendment.20 4
Additionally, the Supreme Court has found a limited "right to privacy"
within the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.20 5
Today, the right to privacy is usually found in connection with
interpreting the Fourth Amendment in instances of criminal
procedure.20 6 To assist in determining if a person is entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court developed a two-part test. 20 7 First, "a person must have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy '20 8 and, second
"that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.',, 20 9 However, later this test was weakened by the Court
holding that when an individual leaves home, "he or she only has an
210
extremely limited expectation of privacy in the in the public view.,
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment "protects
12
hasa held
thathighway.
people2have
example,
people
notexpectation
places. '' 2 11 toFor
public
in a the
car Court
while on
privacy
a reduced

202. SMITH, supra note 197, at 4; Burrows, supra note 196, at 1086.
203. Burrows, supra note 196, at 1086.
204. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) ("We have held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against
the States.") (citations omitted); see also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (quoting Ker v.
Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963)); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (holding that the right
of privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment and applies to States through the Due Process
Clause).
205. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the U.S. Constitution
recognizes a right to privacy which emanates from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and together create a general right to privacy in marital relationships);
Burrows, supra note 196, at 1086-87.
206. Gormley, supra note 197, at 1374 (noting how Fourth Amendment privacy is now a
fixture of criminal procedure).
207. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Burrows,
supranote 196, at 1088.
208. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 360.
210. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (noting a limited privacy
interest of persons on a public street); Burrows, supra note 196, at 1088.
211. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (accepting the two part test as the
standard of Fourth Amendment analysis); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353 (holding that a wan-ant was
needed before the FBI could place an electronic bug in a telephone booth which Katz was about to
use); Burrows, supra note 196, at 1087.
212. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
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A. An Employees Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has been interpreted differently in many
jurisdictions, but it has been interpreted to protect the privacy of both
private and public employees. Employers must effectively balance their
interest in keeping an efficient and productive workplace with their
employees' privacy interests. 213 This interest, however, is not only a
concern of the employers. Most employees also have a legitimate
concern in keeping the workplace efficient and productive and in
preventing their fellow employees from decreasing this efficiency and
productivity. If the workplace is not functioning at an efficient level, the
employer may be forced to cut costs by making pay cuts, or even cutting
jobs.
1. The Right to Privacy of Public Sector Employees
Government employees are entitled to protection under the Fourth
Amendment, while private employees are limited in their protection to
the laws of the particular state in which they work.21 4 The Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is
enforced through a reasonableness standard.2 15 The reasonableness of
the employee's privacy interest must be determined and balanced against
the employer's interest in conducting the search or seizure. 2 16 What is
reasonable in terms of a search, however, depends on the context in
which a search takes place.21 7 This context is determined again by
balancing the employees' privacy interest against the government's
interest to justify the intrusion of the employee's privacy. 2t 8 In some
circumstances, the government has a significant interest in supervising,
controlling, and efficiently operating the workplace, and these interests
may be hard for an employee to overcome. 21 9 In some instances, the
employer may be so intrusive that the employee can have no reasonable

213. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987) (describing that the court must balance
the interest of the employer and employee in order to determine whether or not the employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
214.

Lloyd

L. Rich,

Right

to Privacy in the

Workplace in the Information Age,

http://www.publaw.conprivacy.html (last visited April 20, 2010).
215. O'Connor,480 U.S. at 712.
216. Id. at 719-20; see also United States v. Place 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (describing the
balancing of the employees privacy interest and the interests in the government party conducting the
search).
217. Place, 462 U.S. at 722 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699-701 (1981)).
218.

Id.

219.

See, e.g., id.
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expectation of privacy, and thus will not be protected.22 °
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the
language of the Fourth Amendment protects public employees, which
ensures security in personal effects and protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures because these employees are in fact employed by
the government.221 In O'Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court ruled
that the appropriate standard of reasonableness to be applied to a public
employer's search of its employees is determined from balancing the
privacy interests of the employee against the public employer's interest
in conducting a search.222 The Court said, "[t]he employee's expectation
of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment
Thus, when applying this balancing test to public
relation. 22 3
employees, the general view gives public employers a large amount of
discretion to conduct searches and seizures in order to ensure the proper
224
and crucial operation of governmental agencies or other entities.
For employers to whom the Fourth Amendment applies,
surveillance must be conducted in a way in which it does not interfere
with the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy.225 This limits
the ways that government employers may be able to use surveillance in
order to investigate employees on FMLA leave because employees may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy while in their homes or in
many places outside of the workplace. Courts have granted large
discretion to governmental agencies by applying an open vantage point
rule, where government agencies may survey their employees without
invoking a search if the employee is in open view, and the surveyor is
located at a "lawful-vantage-point., 226 The vantage point test is applied
whether or not the employee could be seen from a lawful vantage point,
not whether or not the person conducting surveillance was actually
located at a lawful vantage point.227 This would allow a federal
employer to conduct surveillance as long as the employee was located in
a public place, such as the supermarket, an airport, or even her front
Federal employers must balance their interest with their
lawn.
employee's interest and conduct the appropriate surveillance in order to
220.

Id. at 717.

221.
222.
223.
224.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See id. at 719-20.
Jd. at 717.
See eNotes, Encyclopedia of Everyday Law, http://www.enotes.com/everyday-law-

encyclopedia/privacy/print (last visited April 20, 2010).
225. See O'Connor,480 U.S. at717.

226. Daniel P. O'Gorman, Looking out for Your Employees: Employer's SurreptitiousPhysical
Surveillanceof Employees and the Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 85 NEB. L. REv. 212, 238 (2006).
227. See id. at 239.
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ensure themselves protection from the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Right to Privacy for Private Sector Employees
The United States Constitution has never been interpreted to
contain a right to privacy that can be extended to reach private
employees. 8
However, private employees are not left without
protection, as many states have adopted constitutional provisions
mandating a right to privacy for all employees.229 Similarly, some state
constitutions have been interpreted to protect the private employee's
right to privacy in the workplace. 230 For example, in Texas State
Employees Union v. Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, the Texas Supreme Court invalidated an employer's
mandatory polygraph policy on grounds that it violated the employee's
right to privacy interpreted from Texas Constitution.23 1 Similarly, the
California Court of Appeals ruled in Luck v. Southern Pacific
TransportationCo. that an employee's right to refuse a drug test was not
absolute under the California Constitution, but the employee's right to
privacy must be weighed against the employer's interest of maintaining
a safe and productive workplace.2 32 In Luck, the court determined that
the California Constitution protected a private employee's right to
privacy when his privacy interests are more substantial than the
employer's countervailing interests.233 This is similar to the balancing
test that the Supreme Court instituted in regards to the Fourth
Amendment.2 34
Not all states are willing to interpret their constitutions to include a
right to privacy for all employees.23 5 Some state courts are not willing to
guarantee a general right to privacy that could possibly be exercised in a
way that may disrupt the workplace and the legitimate business interests
of employers. 6 Thus, most states are reluctant to protect an employee's
right to privacy in the workplace in situations when a reasonable fight to

228.

eNotes, supra note 224.

229.

See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. i, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.

230. See, e.g., Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex Dep't of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987); Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d I (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990).
231. Tex. State Employees Union, 746 S.W.2d at 204.
232. Luck, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 20-21.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citations omitted).
235. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23; MoNT. CONST. art. 11,§ 10; RAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
236. See City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995); 16B Am. JuR. 2D
ConstitutionalLaw § 654 (2002).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss2/6

26

Sipherd and Volpe: Evaluating The Legality of Employer Surveillance Under the Family

20101

EMPLOYER SURVEILLANCE UNDER THE FMLA

privacy would not be expected.23 7 For example, the Florida Supreme
Court in City of North Miami v. Kurtz, ruled that a job applicant was not
entitled to a reasonable right to privacy, allowing her to refuse to
disclose her use of tobacco. 238 In that case, the court reasoned that the
city had a legitimate interest in reducing the health insurance cost of
employees and in increasing the productivity in the workplace. 239 The
court denied the plaintiff protection under both the Florida and United
States Constitutions. 24 0 The Florida Constitution states that "[e]very
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein."24'
The court ruled that this clause was not intended to protect against all
intrusions and that this intrusion was justifiable because Kurtz did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy as to whether or not she was a
smoker.242 The court further ruled that the United States Constitution
did not protect her because the Constitution's privacy provision only
extends to fundamental interests such as marriage and procreation.243
B. Right to Privacy in Regards to Employer Surveillance
The employee's right to privacy is a complicated issue on its own,
but when the employee's relationship to the workplace is extended
beyond these boundaries, as is the case with employer surveillance in
regards to FMLA abuse, we must not only look at the right to privacy
between employer and employee, but also the right to privacy in regards
to the type of surveillance being used by the employer. A question that
has yet to be answered, however, is whether or not this right to privacy is
one that is enjoyed by every citizen. Surveillance tactics are subject to
state and local laws, and employers must avoid tort violations for
invasion of privacy, trespass, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.244 Surveillance in a public place usually does not violate one's
right to privacy because a person's expectation of privacy lessens in
public space. 245 As a result, there is a low likelihood that a claim of
invasion of privacy will be upheld.246 In addition, under the rules of
237.
238.
239.
240.

City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1028.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

FLA. CONST. art. I §23.
Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028.
Id.
See Bradford, supra note 34, at § 14.
Id. at § 15.
Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 139 N.W. 386, 389-90 (Wis.
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evidence, information gained from surveillance is usually admissible at
trial.247
Some jurisdictions have held that video surveillance is
admissible because such evidence is substantive in demonstrating the
extent of the claimant's injuries, 248 while others have held that such
evidence can be used only to challenge the claimant's testimony.2 49 In
either case, courts may exclude the evidence if the "factors favoring
250
admission are substantially outweighed by the factors against it."
In many cases stemming from FMLA violations in which
employers decide to conduct surveillance on their employees' suspected
fraudulent claims, the employer elects to obtain the services of a private
investigator. In order to determine whether or not this tactic is protected
under the employees' right to privacy, one must look at the methods
used by the private investigator. For example, in Pinkerton National
Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens,251 an attempt to shadow the plaintiff
by searching her property, looking into her windows, attempting to gain
entrance into her home under false pretenses, and following her closely
in public places was held to constitute a violation of the fight to
privacy. 25225 Similarly, in Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc.,253 the
court ruled that detectives constantly watching the plaintiffs with
binoculars, trespassing onto their property and constantly looking into
the windows of their homes was an invasion of the right to privacy, and
254
also violated a "Peeping Tom" statute.
However, when surveillance tactics, such as shadowing and trailing
by a private investigator, are done in a reasonable manner, they may not
constitute a violation of the right to privacy even if the investigation is
made apparent to the person being investigated.2 55 The social benefit of
exposing fraudulent claims and the fact that surveillance exposes
fictitious injuries in these cases can outweigh the employee's privacy
interest. 256 For example, in Tucker v America Employers' Insurance
1913) (ruling that plaintiff who was openly shadowed and trailed while he was in public was not
protected by his right to privacy because the surveillance was done while plaintiff was in public).

247.

Quinn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 774 So. 2d 1093, 1097-98 (La. Ct. App. 2000).

248. See Hairston v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 786 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004).
249. See Zegarelli v. Hughes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (N.Y App. Div. 2004).
250. See Quinn, 774 So. 2d at 1097 (explaining the grounds upon which evidence gained on
videotape surveillance is admissible at trial).
251. 132 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963).
252. Id. at 122-23, 125.
253. 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App 1956).
254. Id.at 717-19.
255. See generally, Tucker v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
256. J. D. Emerich, Annotation, Investigations and Surveillance, Shadowing and Trailing,as
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Co.,257 the court held that an investigator who inadvertently made

himself apparent to the women he was trailing was not liable for an
invason
to258
invasion of her right to privacy.
In Tucker, the court ruled that
because the plaintiff filed a personal injury claim and that there is a
public interest in exposing fraudulent personal injury claims, plaintiffs
who file these types of claims should reasonably expect this type of
investigation to be conducted.25 9
C. Does FMLA Surveillance Violate the Employer's Right to Privacy?
In order to determine whether states protect certain privacy
interests, it is very important to look at the language of the Constitution
to determine whether all actors are covered by the provision, or if the
provision only covers state actors. 260
After establishing that the
employee is entitled to a privacy protection under the Federal
Constitution or a state constitution, the plaintiff alleging an invasion of
her privacy must show that one of their legally protected privacy
interests has been violated. 26 1 To prove this violation, the plaintiff must
show that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the given
situation, and that the conduct of the defendant constituted a serious
invasion of this reasonable expectation of privacy.2 62 However, the
defendant may win the case, because of the large amount of leeway she
has to show that the expectation of privacy is not reasonable.263 The
defendant can also defeat the plaintiff by claiming an affirmative defense
showing that the invasion of privacy is justifiable because the defendant
has a countervailing competing interest that outweighs the plaintiffs
reasonable expectation of privacy. 2 4
If conducted in a reasonable matter, FMLA surveillance can be
found to not violate the employee's right to privacy. Employees who
Violation ofRight of Privacy, 13 A.L.R. 3d 1025, § 2 (1967).
257. 171 So. 2d at 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
258. Id. at 439.
259. Id. at 438.
260. See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, Privacy Protections in State
Constitutions,
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationslnfonrmationTechnology/PrivacyProtection
sinStateConstitutions/tabid/1 3467/Default.aspx (last visited April 20, 2010) (containing a list of all
of the articles contained in state constitutions that contain a right to privacy, can be used to compare

the language of the different states).
261.

16B AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 654 (2002).

262. Id.
263. Id. (explaining the different ways the defendant can defeat the plaintiff in a state right to
privacy action).
264. Id.
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submit FMLA claims to their employers should consider the fact that
employers have significant and justifiable interests in substantiating
these claims.

265

Therefore, in these situations the employee's actual

expectation of privacy could be limited. If employers were unable to
substantiate these claims, the FMLA would be open to abuse by all
employees who are willing to lie in order to take off from work without
consequence.266
Society has an interest in preserving the productivity of business,
and if these claims are left unsubstantiated, employees would be able to
take advantage of their employers. FMLA surveillance may not violate
the employee's right to privacy because the employee has a decreased
expectation of privacy after they make an FMLA claim.267 Furthermore,
society as a whole has more of an interest in allowing the employer to
substantiate these claims than it does in broadly protecting the privacy
interest of employees in situations where they can potentially be lying.268
IV. CONCLUSION

In order to be productive, employers must establish and maintain an
However, employees sometimes engage in
efficient workplace.
behavior that is detrimental to an employer's ultimate purpose and,
therefore, employers are forced to find ways to keep employees
motivated and prevent them from abusing porous workplace rules.
Employers are forced to rely on various methods to monitor their
Nevertheless, employees are not left completely
employees. 269
defenseless, there are limits to an employer's ability to monitor and
control employees. Under the FMLA, the government grants employees
certain rights while restricting an employer's ability to interfere with
those granted rights.27 ° Yet, the FMLA is a relatively new law with
many of its details still being worked out in courts across the country.
Like other novel laws, the FMLA is permeable, which allows it to be
abused by malfeasants. Unfortunately, due to the way the act was
drafted, the FMLA attracts abusers who seek extra time off or who are

265. Baldas, supra note 4.
266. See id.
267. Cf Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that an
employee's involvement in a personal injury lawsuit lessens his expectations of privacy). The social
interest in exposing fraudulent FMLA claims is very similar to the social interest in exposing
fraudulent personal injury claims.

268.

Id. at 586-87.

269.
270.

Baxi & Nickel, supra note 5, at 137-38.
See infra Section II.C.
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working two jobs.27 '
Employers need a tool to fight back against employees who take
illegitimate FMLA leave. The existing statutory framework under the
FMLA that allows employers to substantiate an employee claim is
insufficient. It is true that employers are permitted to call and obtain
second and third medical opinions to verify claims, yet this is still not
The increased prevalence of employers turning to
enough.2 72
is
surveillance only added evidence that the FMLA does not adequately
protect employers against employees taking illegitimate FMLA leave.
The FMLA, as it exists today, is not sufficient to protect employers and
therefore, surveillance is a necessary evil. When surveillance is "done
within reasonable limits and upon a reasonable basis," courts have been
willing to uphold and approve its use.273 Thus, this increased approval
by courts may indicate that courts are willing to recognize surveillance
274
as a valid way of substantiating an employee's FMLA leave.
Surveillance is a cost-effective method for employers to verify
legitimate FMLA leave.275 Additionally, when it is done reasonably,
surveillance is not an intrusive or incongruent method of monitoring
employees. Therefore, until the FMLA is amended so that employers
can substantiate claims using other equally cost effective methods,
employers will choose to continue to utilize surveillance. Yet, even if
surveillance is a legitimate method of substantiating claims, the
Department of Labor, or even Congress, must dispel confusion on these
FMLA provisions in order to give clarity to
matters and finalize 2the
76
issues.
disputed
these
Brandon Sipherd* & Christopher Volpe**

271. Greenwald, supra note 13.
272. Id.
273. Id.; See, e.g., Vail v. Raybestos Prod. Co., 533 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2008); Furman v.
Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).

274. Greenwald, supra note 13.
275. See supra Section II.A.
276. See Greenwald, supra note 13.
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